The Stoic concept of the Equality of Moral Errors

Kai tackles a podcast listener question on one of the more challenging of Stoicism's theories....

After being inspired by a Listener’s Letter in the Practical Stoicism Discord mailbag channel, I thought I would take the time to explain an all-too-often overlooked and gravely misunderstood Stoic concept: The Equality of Moral Errors. This concept is not derived from an obscure throwaway line in a Stoic text fragment either! In fact, it is discussed at length by the Stoic philosophers Epictetus and Musonius Rufus, as we are made aware by Epictetus’ Discourses (don’t worry quotes and citations follow).

Photo credit: Zgrredek (2011), LUG Poland

The ancient Stoics liked to explain their concepts via common examples that occur in everyday life, so I will introduce the equality of moral errors in the same way. In the following scenario, we have two speeding car drivers: Tanner and Kai.

Both lose control going 70 mph round a bend near a school. Kai loses control, runs onto the pavement, hits a kid.

Tanner does the same but hits the tree outside the school gate.

When we think of the scenario, what comes to mind when we consider:

Which of them is the “bad” guy?

Which (and thus whose) mistake is worse?

And finally: What do these incidents say about each of their characters? Is Tanner so much better than Kai simply because we don’t typically imprison people for running into trees?

Linked to the concept of the “Equality of Moral Errors”, is the concept of moral luck. Sometimes things we would prefer, all things being equal, happen to us. Sometimes they don’t. It is definitely preferrable to accidentally run into a tree than a child. Yet, should Tanner be able to simply shrug his shoulders and laugh off the fact that he was lucky enough to hit a tree and not someone’s child? Which brings me onto another question...  how many times have we got away with something just because of sheer luck, even though we know what we did was wrong, stupid or completely unnecessary?

For the Stoics, and solely on their respective decision to speed, Tanner and Kai are both as bad as each other. They made the same mistake and so both of them are equally blameworthy when it comes to their unjustified decisions to speed. It’s not like Kai decided to hit a kid any more than Tanner decided to hit a tree. This may not sit comfortably with contemporary mindsets, given our modern sensitivities and our legal framework influenced by consequentialism (the idea that the consequences make an action morally good or morally bad…) but that doesn’t mean that we are the progressive ones.

Stoic logic dictates that there are no degrees of vice or virtue. Something is either done virtuously or viciously. If you are not a Sage than it can be done appropriately or viciously but it cannot, say, be more appropriate or less vicious – for a pop culture example of why this is the case, please read my “The Saiyan and the Sage” Substack article.

Just in case you are tempted to throw in the Stoic towel out of confusion or disbelief, know that you are in established company. Epictetus, in his student days, was just as surprised when his mentor Musonius Rufus said the same thing about comparing making a moral mistake in logic and burning down the Capitol:

Why do we still remain indolent, careless, and sluggish; why do we look for excuses to avoid hard work, or avoid staying awake to cultivate our reason? And some say: ‘But, if I go astray in these matters, it’s not as if I’ve killed my father, is it?’ To  which I say ‘Tell me, slave, where was your father present here for you to kill him? So what have you actually done? Committed the only fault that it was possible for you to commit in the present context’. I myself made the very same remark to Rufus when he once criticised me for not having discovered the missing step in a syllogism: Why, I said, it’s not as if I’ve burned down the Capitol! To which he retorted, ‘In this case, slave, that missing step is indeed the Capitol!’ Or are there no other faults than burning down the Capitol or killing one’s father? Whereas to deal with our impressions in a random, ill-considered, and haphazard fashion, to be unable to follow an argument or demonstration or sophism, and, in a word, to be unable to make out, in question and answer, what is consistent with one’s position and what is not—is none of this is to be regarded as a fault? ­– Epictetus, Discourses 1.7.30-33 (Hard and Gill, 2011, translation).

What is the moral mistake in this case, despite differences in some of the details?

 It is assenting to the wrong impression and, thus, making the wrong judgement about what the right attitude, thought or action you ought to have is. This is of course determined by who you are and  what you are being tasked with. Indeed, and as Epictetus reminds his student, the only things we can control are our thoughts, actions, and attitude in the present moment. In other words, by making a mistake in logic, the aforementioned student failed in the only way he could. The mention of his father and the hypothetical murder had nothing to do with the present moment and therefore didn’t exist. It was entirely irrelevant and had nothing to do with ethics, morality or character – it was merely academic masturbation! In any case, if the student had unjustly killed his father, then from the Stoic perspective, he would have done so because he falsely believed that this was the reasonable thing to do in the circumstances – and there is the same moral mistake and same broken logic!

In a similar example to the car drivers, I gave above, Epictetus explains why unjustly setting fire to a person’s house and unjustly destroying a stork’s or swallow’s nest are examples of the same type of moral error. One behaviour is not better or “less justified” because one error involves humans and the other two species of bird – in sharp contrast to, say, UK Law which distinguishes between the two cases on the material fact that human considerations are deemed worthy of greater punishment and, therefore, any mistreatment of humans is more ethically suspect than the mistreatment of a stork. This is how Epictetus puts it:

What of the death of a multitude of sheep and cattle, and in the burning and destruction of countless nests of storks and swallows? ‘But are the two cases at all similar?’ Perfectly similar. In one case, the bodies of human beings are destroyed, and in the other, the bodies of sheep and cattle. In the one case the little dwellings of human beings are destroyed, and in the other, the nests of storks. What is great or terrible in that? Or show me how human house differs from a stork’s nest. Except that we build our houses from planks, tiles, and bricks, while storks build theirs from twigs and clay? ‘Are a stork and a human being similar in nature?’ How do you mean? At a bodily level, entirely similar. ‘So a human being is no different from a stork?’ Far from it, but they’re no different in this respect. – Epictetus, Discourses 1.28.15-19 (Hard and Gill, 2011, translation).

Now, when it comes to how to respond to someone’s moral error a Stoic will try to ascertain whether that moral error was committed out of an aversion to pain or a weakness for pleasure – at least that’s what Marcus Aurelius suggests. In addition, we should be aware that some moral errors come from a hardened and incurable character and others do not. This aside, for the Stoics it remains the case that all moral errors are committed out of an inability to distinguish what is good, bad or neither. For if we truly knew that what we were doing was bad for us (and, by definition, bad for the wider cosmopolis), we would cease doing it. Likewise, if we truly knew what was good for us, we would do it! That said, and it is important to note that the Stoics do not say that there should be no consequences for bad behaviour or that all punishments should be equal. However, neither do they fall into the trap of immediately tying a person’s character to a conviction. A person convicted of murder is all too often seen as a bad and irredeemable person, no matter what they subsequently do or who they become (which is why, incidentally, I am involved in Stoicism education outreach in Californian prisons via Wisdom Unlocked). It is certainly worth considering what people might say about us, and how they might treat us, if we were forever defined by our worst moment...

To summarise:

Every moral mistake we make is equally bad –there are no degrees. Our decision is either correct or incorrect.

The consequences of our mistakes don’t make them any better or worse than they are already – it is not because something happens to turn out well that our decision proves to be the correct one. Rather, it turned out well despite our mistake! That said, we are called to contemplate what the consequences of our actions might be! We certainly cannot go around flippantly disregarding potential issues – as what does such an attitude say about our character?

Consequences occur in the future and we do not control the future, we only control the decisions we make and the attitude we have in the present moment ­– people often forget this when they consider the dichotomy of control. For example, they will say things like “my actions won’t make any difference when it comes to climate breakdown or standing up against social injustices because other people do X or Y”. We don’t control other people or the consequences of their actions so neither have a bearing on what constitutes an appropriate action for ourselves.

The Equality of Moral Errors should remind us that we are subject to the same errors as everybody else and it takes time and practice for us to avoid them;  the fact is that most people we would rather hide away in prisons or cancel because of their political or religious allegiance, are not so different to us - even if we secretly hope they are.

Kai Whiting is a university researcher and lecturer, the co-host of the Practical Stoicism podcast and co-author of the book Being Better: Stoicism for a World Worth Living In (New World Library).